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or converter is, certainly after demand and refusal, responsible in
conversion to the party entitled to the present possession of the
chattel.
A. DONAT.
San Francisco.
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RIDGWAY v. RIDGWAY.
Condonation is only conditional forgiveness, and condoned adultery and cruelty
may be revived by misconduct, which falls short of adultery.
A husband was guilty of adultery and cruelty, which were condoned by his wife.
He afterwards made improper overtures to, and attempted to take liberties with, a
female servant in his house. Held, that the husband's misconduct revived his
condoned adultery, and that the wife was entitled to a decree for dissolution of the
marriage.

THIS was a wife's petition for a dissolution of marriage on the
ground of her husband's adultery and cruelty, and was tried before
the President of the Division without a jury.
The respondent alleged that the adultery and cruelty had been
condoned.
The petitioner, in giving her evidence, admitted -the condonation,
but there was evidence that the respondent had afterwards attempted
to take liberties with a female servant, whose chastity he solicited.
Inderwic, Q. C., and Bayford, for the petitioner.
The respondent appeared in person.
HANNEN, P.-The question which has been raised (for the first
time, as it seems to me), is one of great importance. It must be
remembered that condonation is always conditional forgiveness.
It is as if the wife were to say to the husband, "You have sinned
against me, but I forgive you upon condition that you do not give
me cause of complaint again." I have, therefore, to consider what
would be the effect of misconduct such as that of which the respondent is proved to have been guilty, being brought home to the
mind of a wife who, after a great trial of feeling, has made up
her mind to live with her guilty husband. She finds that he has
attempted to take liberties with her servant, and solicited her
chastity, and I cannot help thinking that any woman would have
a revulsion of feeling wrought in her by such conduct, and would
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to her husband, "I forgave you, it is true, but it was upon the
condition that you would not be guilty of such conduct as this, and
from this moment, seeing that it is no fault of yours that you have
not committed actual adultery in my own house, and with my own
aervant, whom you have attempted to debauch, I will be no longer
&wife to you, and I revoke the forgiveness which I had extended
to you." In my judgment, that is the true view to be taken. I
believe that misconduct of this kind on a husband's part, though
failing short of actual adultery, is a breach of the condition extended to him by his wife, and that she has a right to complain of
it. I therefore hold that'the adultery and cruelty of the respondent have not been condoned, or, rather, that they have been
revived, by the husband's misconduct, and I pronounce a decree
"i14 with costs.
may

U is not quite easy to undartand the
,k of the presiding judge in the
prindipal case, tha the question in this
cw wassreraised" for the first time,"
fi as early as 1730, in the Consistory
Lz.T. 3d session, it was disCoast,
tdctlyheld that condoned adultery would
be revived by mere act of cruelty, and
*At a wife was at as much liberty to
her husband with former acts of
cge
adultery, as if there had been no reconciliation: Worsl v. Worsley, cited I
Hagg. Ec. R. 734. This was followed
by Apkik v. Popkin, in 1794, in which
Sir Wxaumx ScoTT also held that adultery would be revived by acts of cruelty :
I Hagg. Be. B. 733n. And te subject
was elaborately examined in Darantv.
Darant, I Hagg. 73.3 (1825), in which
Sir Joz NicnoLL uses this language:
"Must the injury be of the same sortbe safficient per se, to found a separatiotf Something short would be suffident, and it seemed almost admitted
tha solicitation of chastity would remove the effect of condonation of adulWry." It is difficult to accede, said he,
to the principle that the subsequent
injury should be ejumdIm generis with the
crime condoned, ,r to suppose that the
implied condition of forgiveness is :
"You may treat me with every degree

of harshness and insult, nay, with actual
cruelty, and I bar myself from all
remedy for your profligate adultery;
only do not commit adultery again."
"The plain reason and good sense of the
implied condition is that ' you shall not
only abstain from adultery, but shall in
future treat me-in every respect, treat
me-with conjugal kindness.' "
And in this country it is uniformly
held not only that the condonation of one
specific offence may be extinguished by
subsequent acts of a similar character,
though of less degree, as adultery by
unchaste conduct, cruelty by severity of
manner or temper, but that the second
offence need not be even of the same
species as the former, and that adultery
may be revived by cruelty or other misconduct in violation of the marriage vow,
though not itself sufficient ground per se
for a divorce: Langdon v. Langdon, 25
Vermont 679 (1853), in which condoned
cruelty was revived by subsequent severity, the exact nature and degree of which
is not given in the report, but it was obviously less 'than sufficient, standing
alone, to found a decree upon, since REDPiEW, C. J., says: "When the new
injury complained of is of a similar
charactr, it isnot necessary it should go
the same extent. For if so, the revival

